Plea Bargain law is adored by NAB as an anti-corruption tool to curb corruption. The sole objective of the method is to let accused charged of official corruption to restore what they have embezzled as firmed by NAB. We are interested in this specific area due to its uncertain approach towards plea bargain with specific reference to NAB. In intent to answer this principal research questions, data were collected through indepth interviews, focus group discussions with NAB through purposive sampling technique and analysing official data of plea bargain (2006-2016). With respect to the operational procedure of plea bargain, it was exposed by many officers that if the accused voluntarily present himself/herself to the NAB during investigation and return the embezzled money plus profit attained by it, then the chairman NAB has the sole power of accepting or rejecting the option. But if the case status is on trial then the ultimate authority are jury concerned. In Addition to that many officers enlightened that, the accused could pay back the required amount in three instalments of 34%, 33% and 33% respectively. Political and bureaucratic interventions are the most influential factors that disturbs the smooth operation of plea bargain while “the way of no other way and panic anxiety of getting arrest” are two main factors contributing to the decision of pleading guilty by the accused. With respect to the effectiveness of plea bargain in NAB, it was uncovered that it is biased and discriminatory in nature towards influential business and political elite class as huge discriminatory patterns are found in the plea bargain data. To get this straight, decentralization of power, incentives and protection for whistle blower, undying engagement of prosecutor and firing of kid glove behavior are policy recommendations which are quite necessary for the fruitful operation of plea bargain in NAB. Supervisor:- Dr. Karim Khan