Abstract

Political  violence can  have  dire implications  given its  scope and  extent leading  to destruction of property,  key infrastructure and mass casualties,  while instigating  po- litical  instability.  Institutions have  evolved to  prevent violent conflict.   The  work presented aims to explore the relationship  between political violence and institutions. I have  explored  this  relationship  from three  distinct  angles  in the  course of three essays.  The first essay explored the frustration-aggression hypothesis.  The first step in this  regard  was estimating  the  social mobilization-institutionalization and  tech- nological change gap.  Then  its impact  on violence and its intensity  is explored and discussed. The second essay investigates the impact of natural resource rents on onset, incidence and intensity  of violence and studies the role of institutional accountability in this relationship.  In this regard the econometric model is based on the predictions generated  from game theoretic  framework  that depicts  institutional accountability may reduce the violence instigating  effect of natural resource rents.  Further, the rela- tionship is explored in the context of four indicators of institutional accountability i.e. political constraints, polity, media freedom and judicial independence.  The third and last essay explores the political violence in Pakistan as commitment problem.  Using the constitution of the country  as a social contract,  the essay explores the incidences of Civil War  of 1971, the  Balochistan  militant separatist movement and  unrest  in Karachi  in 1990s as outcome  of breach  of contract  by the  state  and  the  resultant commitment issue. These three essays offer a multifaceted  understanding of how in- stitutions can mitigate  or exacerbate  political violence, highlighting  the importance of addressing  structural grievances and reinforcing credible commitments  to achieve lasting peace.